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Abstract. This short paper reports on a current project to conduct a detailed 
investigation into non-security professionals’ vocabulary and understanding of 
e-infrastructure and assets, with the longer term aim of building an ontology 
and controlled natural language interface that will allow them to build security 
policies, incorporating complex concepts such as delegation of authority, 
separation of duties (SoD), obligations and conditions.  The interface is 
designed around the principle of the virtuous circle, whereby the user’s 
controlled natural language input is converted into machine processable XML, 
and then converted back again into natural language, so that the user can 
compare the computer’s understanding of his policy with his own. The user can 
then iteratively alter his policy until the input and output are semantically the 
same. To date, two GUI interfaces have been constructed that aid users in the 
construction of authorization policies, and produce natural language output. 
This will serve as a benchmark for measuring the ease of use and effectiveness 
of the controlled natural language interface. Work has started on the controlled 
natural language interface, and the first results are reported. 
Keywords: Authorization, Policies, Controlled natural language, Virtuous 
Circle, XML. 
1. Introduction 
If web services and Grids are to become widely used, they need to be accessible to 
their target research communities, be secured well enough to be available as needed 
and function reliably. A key element in realising this ambition is that the owners and 
donors of web services need to retain control of their resources, and ensure their 
availability and integrity. To do this, resource owners need to express their policies 
for who can use their resources, and how. This is termed authorization. Saltzer and 
Schroeder define authorization as “grant(ing) a principal access to certain 
information” [1]. Several things are needed to ensure that the authorization policy that 
the owner intended to be enacted, is the policy that will finally be implemented by the 
resource’s PDP (policy decision point). Firstly resource owners need to be able to 
state their security requirements correctly and efficiently. In the world of work, this is 
done through written security policies. In today’s computer systems, this is typically 
done via command line or graphical user interfaces (GUIs) which use specialised 
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security terminology. However, as [3] points out, many computer resources owners 
fail to even approach this task because they cannot translate their knowledge of 
resources and access into the computer security terminology used in the GUIs.  
Secondly, the policy’s author needs to be assured that the policy recipients have 
received the policy and have interpreted it correctly, and behave as intended. In the 
world of work, policies are circulated to all employees and contractors of a business, 
in the expectation that they will read and obey them. In the case of computing 
resources, the policy generated by the interface is translated into a machine 
processable format, and transferred to the resource PDP for it to enforce. Thirdly, the 
policy owner needs to periodically check that the policy is indeed being enforced. In 
the world of work, this might be through periodic reports, audits or spot checks. For 
computer resources, the PDP will typically write its access control decisions to an 
audit log that can be periodically inspected by the IT staff.  In this way, it is possible 
to belatedly check, after the fact, that the actual users who eventually gained access to 
the resource were exactly equal to those that the resource owner intended them to be. 
A fourth – and key – aspect in the policy specification and enactment process is that 
the resource owner did not make a mistake in specifying the policy in the first place. 
By “mistake” we mean that unintended consequences arise from enforcement of the 
policy (granting access to those who should not have it, or denying access to those 
who should). These mistakes are caused by misconceptions (in human error 
terminology) as opposed to errors in executing an intended policy incorrectly, e.g. 
through typing errors or confusing resource names (“slips” or “lapses” in human error 
terminology) [4]. When policies are written in controlled natural language, the scope 
for misconceptions is much reduced, and slips or lapses are more easily detected. 
Misconceptions can be due to the complexity of the policy, and the likelihood of 
specifying ambiguities or mutually exclusive clause. The audit log is currently the 
only (post-facto) way of determining if mistakes were made in the policy 
specification, as well as in its enforcement. Something better is needed, namely a pre-
facto way of determining if the policy specification is correct before enforcement 
starts. 
2. The Virtuous Circle 
When specifying web services and grid authorization policies, ideally we want the 
policy tool to support the resource owner in the entire process of correct policy 
specification, and improve his/her understanding of access policies as a result of 
repeated interaction and feedback. In figure 1 below we show a ‘virtuous circle’ in 
which the computer system itself helps the user:  
- to specify a correct policy,  
- ensure that this is the policy that the user intended to specify, and then  
- to confirm to the user that this is the policy that will finally be implemented 
by the PDP. 
In figure 1, the user starts with a mental concept of the policy that he intends to enact, 
and the first step is to transcribe this into the written word in natural language. The 
language and vocabulary used to describe the policy are underpinned by an ontology 
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that we are currently developing. The natural language policy is then parsed and 
processed by the computer and converted into a machine understandable policy, 
written in XML. We have chosen to use XML, since several policy decision points 
(PDPs) already exist that can read in XML policies and enforce them e.g. XACML 
[7] and PERMIS [6]. The XML is then processed with an XSL stylesheet, converted 
back into natural language and displayed to the user. The display not only shows the 
machine’s understanding of the policy, but also is capable of printing out diagnostic 
error and warning messages to show the user where his policy is wrong, inconsistent 
or contains superfluous elements. This allows the user to compare the machine’s 
understanding of his policy with his own, and also to correct the errors in his policy. 
 
3. Progress to Date 
To date, we have captured a basic security ontology from interactions with the user 
community, and built a graphical user interface (GUI), the Policy Editor (see Figure 
2) that allows a user to specify a basic authorization policy using this vocabulary. A 
fuller description of this can be found in [2]. We also have a Policy Wizard variant 
(see Figure 3) that takes the user step by step through the process of creating a policy, 
using individual windows from the Policy Editor. The Wizard allows the user to 
easily create several flavours of a basic authorization policy, but editing an existing 
policy or adding additional features to a basic policy created by the Wizard, is 
achieved via the main Policy Editor.  
Both GUI tools have screens which display the final policy in either natural 
language (Figure 4) or XML. The natural language display enables the user to 
validate, in terms of his own understanding, what the policy actually means to the 
computer system. This forms the second half of the virtuous circle shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 2. The GUI Policy Tool 
 
 
Figure3. The Policy Wizard 
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Figure 4. The Policy Specified in Natural Language 
 
Note that the policy is displayed to the user in full natural language using an XSL 
style sheet.  In the next stage of the project the user will be allowed to create a new 
authorisation policy using controlled natural language. 
4. Controlled Natural Language 
Natural language processing (NLP) is very hard due to the ambiguities and complex 
structure of natural language. Machine translation has been continuously refined for 
decades. Major industry leaders are still performing research into machine translation, 
paraphrasing and information extraction [8, 9]. However, they provide no free tools to 
academia. A number of universities in the UK are developing NLP and Information 
Extraction technologies. However, they are mostly directed at annotating scientific 
texts and analysing vast sources of information in natural language to spot pieces of 
text that are of interest to a scientist [12, 13]. 
In controlled natural language either the vocabulary and/or grammar that can be 
used are limited, being a subset of natural language. This makes machine processing 
much easier and more tractable than using free form natural language. The GATE 
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project (http://gate.ac.uk/), lead by the University of Sheffield, has produced a natural 
language processing kit [5]. It includes a set of tools and grammars that allow English 
and other texts to be analysed. In the project SEKT (Semantic Knowledge 
Technology – http://www.sekt-project.com/), the GATE team has investigated the 
application of controlled languages [10] to the provision of natural language 
interfaces for tasks such as web service protocol description or ontology construction. 
Sheffield has developed a Controlled Language Information Extraction [11] tool 
(CLIE) to aid users in their task. The number of sentence structures allowed by CLIE 
is very limited, which means that it is very easy to learn to use, much easier than for 
example OWL or RDF or tools such as Prodigy. However, the vocabulary for classes 
and instances is unlimited, which means that complex ontologies can still be created.  
We are experimenting with using CLIE to construct ontologies for authorization 
policies. CLIE supports three sentence constructs for creating class and instance 
hierarchies. “There are <class>”, “<subclass> is a type of <superclass>” and 
“<Instance> is a <class>”. CLIE supports one sentence construct for defining 
relationships between classes “<class> (can) have <class>”, and a similar one for 
adding properties to classes “<class> (can) have textual <property name>”. CLIE 
supports two sentence constructs for setting property values for instances: 
“<instance> has <instance>” and “<instance> has property <property> with value 
<instance>”. This limited language allows us to reproduce nearly all the functionality 
 
There are policies. 
“My AC policy” is a policy. 
There are resources and users. 
David is a user. 
Printer is a type of resource. 
“HP Laserjet4” is a printer. 
There are domains. 
Kent is a domain. 
There are “User Account Administrators”. 
Peter is a User Account Administrator. 
There are actions and parameters. 
Print is an action. 
Delete is an action. 
Pause and resume are actions. 
 “No of pages” is a parameter. 
Actions have parameters. 
Print has action with value “No of pages”. 
There are roles. 
Student is a role. 
Staff is a role. 
Resources have actions. 
“HP Laserjet4” has action with value print.  
“HP Laserjet4”has action with value delete.  
“HP Laserjet4” has action with value pause. 
“HP Laserjet4” has action with value resume. 
Table 1. An Example Authorisation Policy Ontology using CLIE 
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of 6 of the 8 tabs in our Policy Editor. (The two tabs that currently cannot be specified 
are the Account Administrator Privileges and the Users’ Privileges.)  The left hand 
column of Table 1 shows the policy sentences typed in by the user, and the right hand 
column shows the resulting class-instance hierarchy ontology created by CLIE (note 
that properties and instance property value assignments are not shown in the right 
hand column). 
5. Future Work 
CLIE is a good start but still needs some enhancements. A current limitation is that it 
only allows the “(can) have” relationship between classes and instances. We have a 
requirement to specify new types of relationship, such as the superior/subordinate 
relationships in role hierarchies, and the “can assign” relationship between 
administrators and roles. Sometimes simpler sentence constructs would be more user 
friendly, for example, making “with value” optional when setting property values. 
More complex sentence constructs are also needed such as “users with these 
properties can access resources with these properties providing these conditions are 
met”. This will require us to tailor the GATE software to use the specific grammar of 
these authorisation sentences using the base ontology provided by CLIE. GATE 
creates an in-memory semantic representation of the user’s newly created sentences 
using the ontology. Any unrecognised or erroneous words will be highlighted, 
prompting the user to take some clarifying action. Plugin tools will be developed to 
extract the user’s intended semantics from unrecognised words, from partially 
specified conditions (e.g. If later than 5), ambiguous phrases (e.g. double negatives) 
or conflicting semantics (e.g. employees can print but managers cannot, when 
managers are superior to employees). Finally, the in-memory semantic representation 
of the policy will be compiled into two XML authorisation policy languages 
(XACML and PERMIS) so that they can then be displayed in natural language via 
style sheets, and subsequently read into their respective PDPs for access control 
decision making. 
Turning to the GUI tools, we are currently increasing the ontology used in them 
and incorporating more complex security concepts such as separation of duties, 
mutually exclusive roles, obligations and constraints.  This is being done by analysing 
transcript’s from interviews with researchers recorded during previous e-Science 
research projects, collected over the past few years. The extracted ontology will be 
validated by testing it with potential e-Science users.  The users will be asked to 
specify polices in natural language for a number of scenarios set in their own research 
environments, and to interpret a number of semi-structured policies and queries.  
The final evaluation trial is planned to be conducted with e-Science researchers 
from a variety of projects – medicine and bioinformatics, sciences, social science, 
data grids and computational grids.  They will be asked to carry out a set of 
standardised policy specification tasks using the natural language tool and the existing 
GUI tools.  With participants’ permission, the interactions will be recorded (both on 
the system and with a video camera), and participants will be asked to think aloud 
while carrying out the tasks and when interpreting feedback received from the tools.  
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This will be followed by a brief questionnaire to assess user satisfaction and perceived 
user effort. The ease of use and effectiveness of the natural language interface will be 
compared and contrasted with that of the GUI and Wizard interfaces. 
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